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INTRODUCTION

As technological advances enable autonomous vehicles to
merge onto public roadways, the effects of this change will be
felt throughout daily lives, with great adaptations required in
many aspects of society. Creating vehicles capable of driving
themselves is only the beginning of a process that includes
significant changes to our road infrastructure, psychological
acceptance necessary to allow a computer to chauffer humans
on their grocery runs, and financial freedom to afford such a
vehicle, coupled with marketing strategies to convince drivers
to give up ownership of a private vehicle and laws that
accommodate the technical and control changes that
accompany autonomous vehicles. The impact vehicle
automation will have on law enforcement and the
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corresponding privacy rights of the users of automated vehicles
is the piece of the puzzle addressed in the following discussion.1
A potentially drastic reduction in law enforcement
engagement with citizens is an often overlooked outcome of
self-driving vehicles, as the focus remains steadily on highway
safety and efficiency of traffic flow.2 Many of the safety benefits
reaped as humans are taken out of the second-by-second
decision-making equation of driving will also eliminate traffic
violations; as vehicles become increasingly automated, the
number of traffic violations will continually decrease.3 At the
point where vehicles are driverless, it appears that the
necessity of traffic-related stops could become moot altogether.4
Between now and then, however, there will be questions raised
every step of the way, with answers that are likely to change as
quickly as the modifications in the technology. Criminal
liability issues in particular will arise in two ways—a
legislative need for the actual rules of the road to change and a
judicial response regarding the enforcement of those laws.
The majority of the answers sought depend on more
detailed specifications of the technologies to be used, as well as
infrastructure plans for self-contained and interconnected
vehicles, but the areas to be impacted are easily identifiable.
This Article will focus on the criminal liability aspects of
automated vehicles, beginning with impacts on the traffic codes
that are expected (and in some cases, have already begun). The
heart of the discussion will be in the judicial response category,
examining the privacy protections around the digital
information created by the car itself. The conclusion will
identify possible courses of action for both government entities
and manufacturers of these vehicles as they establish the
parameters in which the vehicles operate.

1. Automated Vehicles have varying levels of automation, while
autonomous vehicles are capable of driving themselves independently.
Additionally, some self-driving vehicle concepts include vehicle-to-vehicle and
vehicle-to-infrastructure communication.
2. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Autonomous and Automated and Connected
Cars—Oh My! First Generation Autonomous Cars in the Legal Ecosystem, 16
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 619, 663 (2015) (“[J]ust over half of all citizen contacts
with police occur in connection with traffic stops.”).
3. See Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal Liability Issues
Created by Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157, 1158 (2012).
4. Pursuit of criminals would still require traffic stops, but would not
likely be considered a traffic-related stop.
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I. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: CHANGING THE TRAFFIC
CODE
Automated vehicles will eliminate traffic offenses, create
traffic offenses, and change the implications of everything from
who is driving to how violations are defined.5 Several states
and the District of Columbia have begun authorizing
autonomous vehicles legislatively,6 although experts argue that
a lack of permission in other jurisdictions does not necessarily
serve as a prohibition of their use.7 The first priority in
establishing regulation of these vehicles is designating who is
responsible for their operation. Operation of—or control of, in
the legal sense—the vehicle is required by every state that
expressly allows for the testing or use of an autonomous vehicle
on public roads.8 In Nevada, this requirement for operation is
met by a “human operator . . . [s]eated . . . [m]onitoring . . . [and
c]apable of taking over immediate manual control of the
autonomous vehicle in the event of a failure of the autonomous
technology or other emergency.”9 Nevada also requires a
specific “driver’s license endorsement for the operation of an
autonomous vehicle,”10 while Florida specifies that anyone
“who possesses a valid driver license may operate an
autonomous vehicle in autonomous mode.”11
That these legislative approaches require a human
operator is likely a reflection of the tolerance of the general
public’s comfort level. It is also the simplest transition
available to lawmakers who face the task of navigating a
complicated road of strict liability traffic violations, settled

5. Gabriel Weiner & Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving:
Legislative & Regulatory Action, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y,
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_Driving:_Legisla
tive_and_Regulatory_Action (last modified Feb. 3, 2015) (providing a current
fifty-state survey of statutes that were adopted or changed in order to address
increases in autonomous vehicles).
6. See id.
7. Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the
United States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411, 413 (2014).
8. See Weiner & Smith, supra note 5; infra notes 9–11 and
accompanying text.
9. NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.070(1)–(3) (2013); see also CAL. VEH. CODE §
38750(b)(2) (West 2015).
10. NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.200 (2013).
11. FLA. STAT. § 316.85(1) (2014).

830

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 16:2

court precedents, and looming public safety concerns.12 If there
is an operator responsible for the behavior of the vehicle, then
speeding is still speeding, drunk driving will continue to result
in a DWI, and negligence can be met as an intent requirement
in a fatal accident. Interestingly, some states that demand an
operator pay attention to the vehicle on autopilot have
exempted those very operators from bans on texting and use of
handheld wireless communications devices.13
If the autopilot of airplanes is of any use in predicting
effects of the automation of vehicles, the biggest problem with
holding drivers responsible as operators, even though they are
not operating cars in a meaningful way, is complacency.
Human error, whether through boredom or simply not paying
attention, “remains the leading cause of aviation accidents” as
automation has increased.14 Another significant difficulty with
holding drivers accountable as operators is the potential
benefits lost from a policy standpoint without a “designated
driver” option, including the possibility of being used as a latenight ride home for an intoxicated person,15 a shuttle for an
elderly person who no longer can pass a driving test, or a taxi
for someone not yet old enough to take the wheel himself.16
Drivers of the next generation must be considers as well;
eventually there will be people whose driving experience is
limited to self-driving vehicles. It is likely that handing control
over to an inexperienced operator in the case of an emergency
would yield a worse result than having the car make decisions
for itself.
A challenge to this operator-as-babysitter approach is
already on the horizon, as Google has announced that its

12. See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 3, at 1162 (discussing how new
laws regulating autonomous vehicles might “var[y] significantly from
traditional laws that consider the operator of a motor vehicle to be actively
controlling the vehicle.”).
13. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.305(3)(b)(7) (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. §
484B.165(7) (2013).
14. Maria Konnikova, The Hazards of Going on Autopilot, NEW YORKER
(Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/science/maria-konnikova/hazards-a
utomation (introducing the article with a narrative about a flight crew
engaged in a distracting conversation during landing which caused an
unnecessary stall and killed everyone on board).
15. Formerly known as the “Take me home, I’m drunk” button. Douma &
Palodichuk, supra note 3, at 1158.
16. Id.
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driverless cars will be ready for deployment in two to five
years.17 These cars have no steering wheel and no pedals18
(although for test purposes manual controls are present
because they are required under California law19). Whether
California will choose to amend its regulations to allow for
Google’s design is yet to be seen, but Google “hope[s to] see you
on the streets of Northern California” in 2015.20
Switching gears to actual traffic violations, it does not take
much of an imagination to see how some offenses could easily
be eliminated over time and how the creation others will be
absolutely necessary in order for the technology to progress.
Expired registration tags and the proof of insurance
requirement could become things of the past if autonomous
vehicles require codes confirming the car is up-to-date
administratively to function. Further, some prominent new
offenses will likely address handovers from autopilot to human
operator,21 situations where autonomous vehicles are
prohibited,22 and the consequences for hacking into a vehicle’s
driving technology.23
There is also a category of pre-existing laws that will need
modification to accommodate autonomous vehicles, some of
which should already be revised considering the number of
vehicles on the road already that possess low-level automated
capabilities.24 These low-level automations include driver
assistance such as adaptive cruise control and partial
automation features like lane assist.25 Even when working
properly, it is possible for adaptive cruise control to
17. The Associated Press, Google Expects Public in Driverless Cars in 2 to
5 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2015, 5:34 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/ap
online/2015/01/14/business/ap-us-google-driverless-car.html.
18. Id.
19. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(c)(1)(D) (West 2015).
20. Google Self-Driving Car Project, GOOGLE PLUS (Dec. 22, 2014)
https://plus.google.com/+GoogleSelfDrivingCars/posts/9WBWP2E4GDu.
21. See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 3, at 1162–64 (discussing new
regulations for autonomous vehicles).
22. See generally id. (discussing scenarios where the driver would be
required to take control of an autonomous vehicle).
23. Id. at 1159, 1164–68.
24. JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (2014), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR443-1
/RAND_RR443-1.pdf.
25. Id.
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“misbehave” under the written rules of the road.26 For example,
if a car is gauging speed based on the vehicle in front of it in a
thirty-five mile per hour zone, what happens as the two
vehicles pass into a fifty-five mile per hour zone? The second
car will likely be speeding at some point. Following too closely
is another citable activity that becomes routine for cars
traveling together with adaptive cruise control.27 Lane assist
features present their own problems that range from switching
lanes inappropriately to creating unnecessary traffic stops
because of weaving.28 Along with technical issues, it will also be
important for the new traffic code to clarify the standards for
automated operators if they are different from those expected
of human operators. The question has been raised whether
standards “merely require an automated vehicle to perform as
well as a reasonable human driver—or will governments,
courts, and consumers expect something more?”29
Other states are looking at the legislative prototypes as
they are adopted, with many proposals sitting in committee.30
Legislators, as well as proponents of the technological
advances, are looking to the federal government for nationwide
guidelines, but the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) is hesitant to recommend rules for
consumer use.31 NHTSA’s reserved involvement has frustrated

26. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ROAD SAFETY: IMPACT OF
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 77 (2003).
27. Id. (“Abuse of new technologies is also a serious threat. As an example
if adaptive cruise control results in drivers following each other too closely,
then risk might actually increase.”).
28. Chad Kirchner, Lane Keeping Assist Explained, MOTOR REV. (Feb. 17,
2014), http://motorreview.com/lane-keeping-assist-explained/ (discussing the
strengths as well as the weaknesses of new lane keeping assist technologies).
29. Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the
United States, CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Apr. 15, 2013, 11:58 AM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/04/automated-vehicles-are-probably-le
gal-united-states. Smith also asks, “how and to whom will laws that prescribe
‘reasonable,’ ‘prudent,’ ‘practicable,’ and ‘safe’ driving apply?” Id.
30. See Weiner & Smith, supra note 5 (presenting a breakdown of the
progress various states have made in terms of autonomous vehicle legislation).
31. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 10
(2013),
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf
/Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf (“NHTSA has considerable concerns . . . about
detailed state regulation on safety of self-driving vehicles, and does not
recommend at this time that states permit operation of self-driving vehicles
for purposes other than testing.”).
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the process for some, as Florida’s Autonomous Vehicle Report
points out, “[w]hile NHTSA recommends establishing reporting
requirements to monitor the performance of self-driving
technology during testing, Department staff does not have the
expertise to interpret or apply the results. This is a function
normally provided by the federal government (NHTSA).”32 It
appears, unsurprisingly, that it is difficult to create legislation
around a technology that doesn’t yet exist.33 On the other hand,
it is possible that government intervention could stifle progress
and limit the development of this technology by addressing
only that which is reasonably anticipated at the moment rather
than looking to potential uses ten or twenty years down the
road.
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSE: IS IT A PHONE, IS IT A CAR . . .
IT’S A MINICOMPUTER!
The only place a conversation on the Fourth Amendment
and transportation technologies can start is with the creation of
data. The bottom line is that once data exists, it is accessible
for prosecutorial use.34 The strength of the restrictions on its
use through the courts, specific legislation aimed at protecting
the data of users of smart vehicles, and the architects who
make the final calls on privacy and security decisions in
automated vehicles each play important roles in setting
expectations—not just for criminals, but all consumers—in the
new era of smartphones, minicomputers, and self-driving
vehicles.
If the discussion on legislating autonomous vehicles
created uncertainty around the development of applicable
traffic codes, the privacy protections surrounding data found
within those vehicles are equally difficult to predict considering

32. JULIE L. JONES, FLA. HIGHWAY SAFETY & MOTOR VEHICLES,
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE REPORT 5 (2014), available at http://www.flhsmv.gov
/html/HSMVAutonomousVehicleReport2014.pdf.
33. See Alex Davies, Self-Driving Cars Are Legal, but Real Rules Would
Be Nice, WIRED (May 15, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/05/selfdriving-cars-legal-real-rules-nice/ (“The tech is new, complicated, and being
developed in different ways by different companies, so just understanding how
it works is difficult, let alone knowing how to make it work safely.”).
34. See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 3, at 1167–68; Dorothy J.
Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1196,
1216 (2012).
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the absence of examples to study at this point in time.35 This
creates difficulties because there are a wide variety of
prototypes utilizing various levels of automation, some sharing
similar technology, but all having unique attributes.36 It is
hard to determine the level of privacy protection expected when
one cannot even determine exactly what is being protected.37
Automated vehicles will potentially contain a wealth of
digital information previously unavailable to law enforcement
officers, including personally identifiable information, route
history and planning, and a log of the car’s actions.38 The
protections afforded through the Fourth Amendment will be
vital in making the public feel comfortable using these vehicles
without having a chilling effect on their actions. The mobile
nature of the car lends itself to creating locational privacy
problems, but the Supreme Court has not yet tackled the issue.
In 2012, warrantless GPS tracking came before the Court in
United States v. Jones, but was decided in a narrow ruling on
trespass.39 While the Jones ruling that did not lay out
expectations that can be relied upon for future vehicle-related
privacy cases, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence pieced together
the Mosaic theory to address the locational privacy issue
presented.40 It is more common to see location-based cases
arising out of historical and real time cell site location
information cases, in which people are tracked by their cell
phone signals. None of these cases have reached the Supreme
Court however, and the lower courts are split significantly.41
The best insight into whether information stored in an
automated vehicle will be accessible by a warrantless search
also comes in the context of cell phones. Riley v. California
35. Glancy, supra note 34, at 1216–17 (“Because autonomous vehicles are
not yet available for general use, predictions about privacy expectations
regarding autonomous vehicles necessarily have to be extrapolated from
experience with other types of vehicles, transportation issues, and intelligent
systems.”).
36. Id. at 1172–73.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1186.
39. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–53 (2012).
40. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
41. E.g., United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding
no warrant was needed to access location data from a cell service provider),
aff’d in relevant part, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015); Tracey v. State, 152 So.
3d 504 (Fla. 2014) (holding that accessing real time cell site location
information required a warrant).
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addresses digital data head on for the first time and does so in
way that is meaningful beyond the facts in either of the cases
at hand.42
III. RILEY FACTS
Riley was pulled over for driving with expired registration
tags, and the traffic stop resulted in his car being impounded
because his license had been suspended.43 An inventory search
of his car revealed two handguns under the hood, resulting in
Riley’s arrest for possession of concealed and loaded firearms.44
When searching Riley, an officer seized his smartphone and
noticed what he presumed to be the gang abbreviation “CK”
next to names in the phone.45 Later, another detective went
through Riley’s phone looking for more gang-related evidence,
during which photos of Riley in front of a car allegedly used in
a shooting were discovered.46 Riley was charged with (and
eventually convicted of) firing at an occupied vehicle, assault
with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted murder.47 His
sentence of fifteen years to life in prison carried an
enhancement due to committing those crimes for the benefit of
a criminal street gang.48
Wurie was arrested after being observed making a drug
sale.49 Two of his cell phones were seized, including a flip
phone.50 A police officer pressed one button to access the call
log and another to determine the phone number associated
with the “my house” label shown on the external screen.51 The
number was traced to an apartment building where they saw
Wurie’s name on the mailbox and a woman resembling the

42. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). The Riley decision deals
with two sets of facts. The first set of facts concerned Riley, who was arrested
as a result of a traffic stop for driving with expired registration tags. Id. at
2480. The second set of facts dealt with Wurie, who was arrested after his
involvement in an apparent drug deal. Id. at 2481.
43. Id. at 2480.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2480–81.
47. Id. at 2481.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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photo on his phone through a window.52 The building was
secured while they got a warrant, after which 215 grams of
crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and
ammunition, and cash were found in Wurie’s apartment.53
Convictions stemming from this search led to a prison sentence
of 262 months.54
IV. RILEY FINDINGS: THE DIGITAL FRONTIER
The decision in Riley heralds the Supreme Court’s arrival
in the “digital age,” a time in which the majority of people
“carry a cache of sensitive personal information” as they go
about their days.55 The Court held that a warrant is generally
required when searching digital information on a cell phone
seized during a lawful arrest.56 In Riley, the information was
contained in a cell phone, but the Court made clear that the
protection is around digital data, describing both flip phones
and smartphones as “minicomputers that also happen to have
the capacity to be used as a telephone.”57
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of one’s “persons, houses, papers, and
effects,” generally requiring a warrant showing probable cause
to justify such a search.58 Exceptions to the warrant
requirement are described in Wyoming v. Houghton as a
balancing act between the furthering of government interests
and the extent of an intrusion on an individual’s privacy.59 The
Court refers to three cases—Chimel, Robinson, and Gant—for
the context of the search incident to arrest (SITA) exception to
the warrant requirement.60 Chimel provides the groundwork
for the SITA doctrine in the form of two prongs that examine
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2482.
55. Id. at 2490.
56. Id. at 2493.
57. Id. at 2489.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
59. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999) (“[W]e must evaluate
the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”).
60. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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the government interests of officer safety and preservation of
evidence.61 In Robinson, the Court broadly found the Chimel
prongs to be satisfied in all searches incident to lawful arrest,
rejecting a case-by-case determination of whether a weapon or
evidence was likely to be found.62 The pocket searching in
Robinson was not seen as a greater intrusion of privacy beyond
the arrest itself.63 A third case applies specifically to the search
of an arrestee’s vehicle.64 Gant extended the SITA exception
when it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime
of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”65
In Riley, the Court held that neither prong of government
interest in Chimel was furthered when applied to the digital
contents of cell phones.66 As far as officer safety is concerned,
while the physical phone could be examined for potential use as
a weapon, the data inside cannot cause harm to the officer.67
Warning an officer of impending backup called for by the
arrestee was also raised as a potential safety issue and
concerns about the destruction of evidence through remote
wiping of data or data encryption were considered,68 but the
Court noted those situations can be better addressed through a
case-specific exception like the one for exigent circumstances.69
Although there was very little to be found in terms of
legitimate government interests at stake, the digital distinction
lies on the other side of the Wyoming v. Houghton balancing

61. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63 (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable
for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape . . . . In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent
its concealment or destruction.”).
62. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
63. Id.
64. Gant, 556 U.S. at 332.
65. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343.
66. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2478 (2014) (“But a search of
digital information on a cell phone does not further the government interests
identified in Chimel, and implicates substantially greater individual privacy
interests than a brief physical search.”).
67. Id. at 2485.
68. Id. at 2485–86 (suggesting two solutions for the prevention of remote
wiping or encryption: (1) remove the phone’s battery, or (2) use Faraday bags
to isolate the phone from radio waves).
69. Id. at 2494 (providing reassurance that “extreme hypotheticals” can be
addressed through the exigent circumstance exception).
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test. The Court did not extend Robinson to permit searches of
data stored on cell phones because of the vast difference
between a search of physical objects and digital content;
searching pockets is not that much more intrusive than the
actual arrest itself, but it is considerably different than
searching digital data.70 Instead, Riley classifies a cell phone
search as a substantial intrusion because of both the
quantitative and qualitative differences between digital data
and physical objects.71 Not only can a phone store many
distinct types of information, it can hold an immense quantity
of just one type information72—a phone fits in a pocket, but can
hold more than a house.73 The information held in cell phones
often touches on every aspect of people’s lives: Internet
browsing history, location data to reconstruct movements, and
apps for everything from tracking pregnancy symptoms to
political party affiliations.74 Therefore, a search of a cell phone
and all of the sensitive information it contains outweighs the
minimal government interest present.75
Finally, the government’s argument to extend the
application of Gant from the context of vehicle-related
circumstances was rejected by the Court, finding it would have
“no practical limit at all when it comes to cell phone
searches.”76 Without discussion, the Court pointed to previous
cases that laid a foundation of a diminished expectation of
privacy only in the vehicle context, as well as the more heavily
weighted government interest in vehicle searches.77 Other

70. Id. at 2484 (“But while Robinson’s categorical rule strikes the
appropriate balance in the context of physical objects, neither of its rationales
has much force with respect to digital content on cell phones.”).
71. See id. at 2489.
72. Id. Without mentioning United States v. Jones, Justice Roberts points
out that this decision does not address whether “the collection or inspection of
aggregated digital information amounts to a search under other
circumstances.” Id. at 2489 n.1.
73. Id. at 2491 (“Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house . . . .”).
74. Id. at 2490.
75. Id. at 2478.
76. Id. at 2492.
77. Id. (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004); Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303–04 (1999)).

2015]

DRIVING INTO THE DIGITAL AGE

839

fallback options were dismissed as well, based on their inability
to provide clear categorical rules.78
The facts of Riley indicate the case is about the information
contained on a cell phone, but the decision was made on data—
the 200-year-old institution has entered the digital frontier.
Embracing this new terrain does not include looking back and
seeing that the old way was wrong; instead it means
acknowledging that some things will need to be handled
differently moving forward.
V. WILL SDVS REAP RILEY’S BENEFITS?
In declining to apply the Robinson rationale to cell phones,
the Court established that a search of digital content
constitutes substantial intrusion upon an individual’s privacy,
creating a different rule for handling digital searches than is
used for physical searches.79 The ruling suggests a natural
extension of this protection to other containers of digital data
by labeling cell phones as “minicomputers.” While the potential
for its application to automated vehicle technology remains
uncertain,80 Riley indicates that the interest in protecting the
personal information disclosed through use of such a vehicle
would be weighed heavily as well.81
Like cell phones, autonomous vehicles could contain types
of digital data that are qualitatively different from physical
objects and could have the capacity to record that data in
significant amounts. As mentioned above, the three most
sensitive types of data would be personally identifiable
information, route history and planning, and a log of the car’s
actions. The combination of this information could readily
confirm the identity of a driver while revealing where she has
been and is going, as well as provide evidence that a traffic
violation has occurred. Even just one aspect, though, in a large
78. Id. at 2491 (dismissing the government’s suggestions of applying an
analogue test, saying it would create questions of which digital files are
comparable to physical records; it would also allow a more invasive search
because it could include items not typically carried in physical form).
79. Supra note 70 and accompanying text.
80. It should be acknowledged that it isn’t clear what that technology will
even look like. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
81. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492 (“[I]n the vehicle context Gant restricts broad
searches resulting from minor crimes such as traffic violations.”). The decision
goes on to discuss cell phone searches to look for evidence of speeding or
texting while driving. Id.

840

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 16:2

quantity is likely considered an intrusion.82 For example, the
location information element could be structured in a way to
show where a person has been in the last twenty-four hours, if
routes were time stamped and biometrics authentication of
users were required to operate the vehicle.
Although it may seem apparent that sensitive digital data
such as this assuredly deserves protection after reading Riley,
Gant’s automobile exception to the warrant requirement will
have some effect on the balance of the equation because of the
diminished expectation of privacy in vehicles. Even though the
Court did not extend Gant’s holding that the SITA exception
includes searches for evidence related to the crime of arrest
because there would be no practical limit to the search of a cell
phone, when that same rule is applied solely in the vehicle
context and to a search of the vehicle itself, it could yield a
different result. Another decision leaning in the government’s
favor is Knotts,83 which established that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a person’s movements “in an
automobile on public thoroughfares.”84 Even though this rule
has never been overturned, two concurrences in Jones found
some types of surveillance to violate a reasonable expectation of
privacy.85 The concurrences were signed by a total of five
justices,86 indicating Knotts is susceptible to challenge.
The Court’s desire to provide law enforcement with clear,
categorical rules would run into the same difficulties with
automated vehicle technology that were present in Riley’s
smartphone if Gant were applied. There would be no practical
limit to the amount of information accessed and the substantial
intrusion of privacy would remain the same. However, vehicles

82. See id. at 2489–91 & n.1 (discussing the privacy consequences arising
from the quantitative capacity of a cell phone).
83. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
84. Id. at 281. But see Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 295, 299 (“But that does not mean that expectations of
privacy on public roads are worthy of no legal protection at all.”).
85. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, JJ., concurring)
(“[S]ociety’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others
would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long
period.”).
86. Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan joined Justice
Alito’s concurrence. Id.
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are highly regulated and there is precedent acknowledging the
diminished expectation of privacy on the open road.87 Whether
the government’s interest in gaining incriminating evidence of
moving violations is significant enough to justify the intrusion
of privacy is yet to be seen.
CONCLUSION
While the road ahead is not perfectly clear, it is
encouraging that some states are taking the lead on creating a
regulatory structure for the testing of autonomous vehicles in
the absence of federal guidelines and that the courts have
identified digital data as worthy of substantial protection. The
legislative process must be proactive in addressing the needs
identified here as manufacturers progress through the levels of
automation available in consumer vehicles, with states
producing more thorough codes and Congress establishing the
Riley digital privacy protections in a way that specifically
applies to automated vehicle technology. In the meantime, the
next Supreme Court cases likely to have direct impact on
autonomous vehicles will be centered on locational privacy
issues that come from cell site tracking.
As levels of automation increase to the point where selfdriving vehicles do not necessarily rely on a human operator
present and where infrastructure development allows these
vehicles to become interconnected rather than self-contained,
more questions will be raised. If infrastructure enters the
equation, expect the availability of real time location
information to become an even hotter topic and to hear some
experts discuss the possibility of central control options like
rerouting vehicles in emergencies or police executing traffic
stops electronically.

87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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